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"cunable to form a wilful, deliberate and premeditated design to
kill or of judging of his acts and their legitimate consequences ;"
and in distinguishing between this state and the first lies the only
difficulty. The method usually adopted by attorneys and sometimes also by judges, is by inquiring into the number of drinks
taken. This, of course, can furnish no criterion whatever, as
instances have been known of men who could drink until the
stomach would retain no more and yet riot be intoxicated, whilst a
single dram may make others mad. The only safe rule is to take
some well-established division, such as that of 11offbauer, which
we have followed above, and to permit no case which does not
clearly fall within the second or third stages of drunkenness to
receive extenuation, on the ground of incapacity to commit a crime
of which an intet to take life is the essential and distinguishing
characteristic.
,J.I. LIND.
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SAMUEL D. PENDAR v. GEORGE J. KELLEY.
'Where a statute directs that any note or bill of exchange, "given for a patent
right," shall contain those words in the body thereof, and makes it a misdemeanor
for any person to take a note for such consideration without the insertion of those
words, the primary object of such statute is to enable the maker to defend for
failure of consideration and to give notice to future holders of his right to do so.
Such a statute does not make the note itself illegal and void without those
words, nor bring it within the rule that the infliction of a penalty upon an act
makes it per se illegal and prevents it from being the foundation of a civil action.
Heice, when the maker of a note for such consideration omits to have the words
inserted, the failure of consideration is no defence against an innocent holder for

value.

AssumPSIT on a note in common form, made by the defendant
in 1873,. payable to Abell or order four months from date, and by
Abell sold, and endorsed in blank to the plaintiff before due. The
plaintiff bought it in good faith, without knowledge or notice of
its consideration, paying something less than its face.
The county court gave judgment for the plaintiff for the sum
he paid for the note, to which the defendant alleged exceptions.
The note was given on the purchase by defendant of an interest
in a patent for a spring bed-bottom. By a statute of 1870 it is a
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misdemeanor for any person to take a note for such a consideration, without the words, "given for a patent right," prominently
and legibly inserted in the body of the note and above the signature, and a note with those words in it is subject to all defences,
if transferred, to which it would be subject if owned by the original payee. The note was taken by Abell in violation of that statute. There was a total failure of consideration.
Allen, for defendant, claimed that the act of taking said note
being a misdemeanor, punishable by fine, the note itself is as much
illegal and void as if the statute in express terms had declared it
to be so, and is so, even in the hands of an innocent holder for
value.
Crane, for plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BARRETT, J.-We think the statute in question in this case was
designed to enable the maker of any promise or obligation in writing for aft interest in a patent right, to forefend himself against
indefensible liability under the law merchant. It is left with him
whether he will make the 8alvo of the statute available for his own
protectioh or not. If he sees fit to give his negotiable paper in the
commercial form, without the "stop-thief" warning in It, it is not
for him to go back on some person who has lawfully and innocently
dealt with the thief in respect to the paper just as if he was an
honest man-the character in which the maker of the paper permitted him to appear with the paper for use and disposal, notwithstanding the maker had lawful opportunity and power to stamp his
true character and the character of the paper on the face of the
paper itself. The provision for a penalty against the person who
shall take such paper without these words of warning in it, is not
in like ternrs, nor on the same reason, as the statutes prohibiting
gaming, the sale of intoxicating liquors, jand the like, which declare
void all contracts upon such consideration. In the present case,
it is not criminal, "according to law," to sell an interest in a patent. It is not criminal,though generally it is intensely foolish,
for unskilled men to buy such an interest, especially of the smoothtongued, blandly impudent rascals who throng the country, and
play "heathen chinee" upon rustic greed for money to be made
by short cut, instead of being earned by plodding and honest industry in accustomed pursuits. It is not unlawful to give such
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paper without the prescribed words inserted. The statute was not
designed to reflect on the contract, or to affect the legal quality or
usableness of the paper. As between the maker and payee, and
as between the maker and parties taking the paper overdue, or
with notice of defective consideration, there was no need of the
statute, unless,for the purpose of having the note itself bear conclusive evidence of being subject to defence on the score of consideration. It is mainly to enable the maker to defend against
the note when negotiated before due, that the insertion of the words
of warning is required. The provision for the penalty was made
in tender consideration of the fact (antagonistic to the maxim,
that every one is presumed to know the law), that persons not
knowing the law, might give notes without that clause inserted,
unless the peril of the penalty should hold the swindler from taking such paper. The additional provision for redress by action
points plainly to the view, that no other consequences than those
expressed in the statute were to ensue upon the taking of such
paper, without that clause inserted. The party to the sale of the
patent who takes such paper is subjected to liability to the penalty,
and to reimburse any damage accruing to the maker. The main,
if not the only way, in which damage would seem likely to accrue
to the maker would be by some innocent holder of it, when negotiated before due, enforcing payment from the maker. The immunity thus provided against the consequences of ignorance, heedlessness or recklessness, or even the foolishness of persons disposed
to dabble in the purchase of interests in patent rights, seems to be
the full extent intended by the legislature, and quite as much as
that class of citizens can reasonably ask. The principle of the case
of .Pa8 umpsic.Bank v. Goss, 31 Vt. 315, and of many like cases
before and since, is applicable in full force in the present case,
as showing that the morality involved requires that the defendant
should not be permitted to cast on the plaintiff, who is an innocent
bondfide holder, the burden from which he might have protected
both himself and the plaintiff, but for his own negligence in that
Judgment affirmed.
behalf.
The decision in the above case seems
most unquestionable. It has long been
an elementary principle in the law of
negotiable paper, that mere illegality
in the consideration could not be urged
es a defence against a bond fide holder
Vor. XXI.-65

for value, and who derived title to the
same while it was still current. There
is indeed one exception to the rule,
where the statute declares the note void
in the hands of all pprsons to whom it
shall come in the course of negotiation.
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This is the case in the English and
many of the American statutes against
gaming and usury, and some others, at
the present day : Story on Promissory
Notes, f 191, 192, and notes.
The defcet here seems to have been
in the statute, which, of course, the
courts could not supply. Very likely
the statute could not have been obtained
with the declaration that security given
upon such consideration should be held
void in all hands. For it must be confessed that there is great tenderness
manifested towards that class of thieves
and robbers, who name their ill-gotten
gains by any species of speculation.
There seems to be a kind of regret felt
that such men should find their gains
turning to ashes in their hands. Few
men, comparatively, feel prepared to

conlemn the dealing in any speculative
commodities and to stamp them with
the brand of illegality. This may account for the defect in the statute. But
the decision is most unquestionable.
Statutes similar to the one referred to
in the principal case (which we take to
be the parent of the absurd brood) have
been passed recently in several of the
states, and are beginning to produce
their inevitable crop of litigation ; but
we believe the courts have uniformly
given them the same constructionrequired alike by legal principles and
common honesty-as in the foregoing
opinion. See Zinnzernan v. Rote, 75
Penna. St. 188 ; Nebker v. Cochran,
14 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 697.
I. F. R.

sSuprerne Court of the United States.
MARY R.KOIIL

ET AL.

v. THE UNITED STATES.

The right of eminent domain is inherent in all governments by virtue of their
sovereignty. For all purposes required by the constitution, this right exists in
the United States independently of any consent of the state in which the property
lies.
Such state can neither control the right nor prescribe the mode of its exercise.
Its consent is necessary, if at all, only for the transfer of exclusive jurisdiction
and right of legislation after the land has been acquired.
Seinble, A state has no power to condemn and take lands for the use of the United
States. The correct mode is a proceeding by the United States directly.
The word purchase is technically large enough to include an acquisition by
taking under the right of eminent domain, but as used in statutes generally, it
means only an acquisition by contract between the parties without governmental
interference. In connection, however, with the words " at private sale or by condemnation," it includes the authority to take land by virtue of eminent domain.
A proceeding to take lands for public use, is a suit at common law within the
language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and where Congress has not prescribbd
any other tribunal, the Circuit Court has jurisdiction.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the

Southern District of Ohio.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-It has not been-seriously contended during the argu-

ment that the United States government is without power to appro-

KOHL v. THE UNITED STATES.

515

priate lands or other property'within the states for its own uses and
to enable it to perform its proper functions. Such an authority is
essential to its independent existence and perpetuity. These cannot be preserved if the obstinacy of a private person, or if any
other authority can prevent the acquisition of the means or instritments by which alone governmental functions can be performed.
The powers vested by the Constitution in the general government
demand for their exercise the acquisition of lands in all the states.
These are needed for forts, armories and arsenals, for navy-yards
and light-houses, for custom-houses, post-offices and court-houses,
and for other public uses. If the right to acquire property for
such uses may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of.
property-holders to sell, or by the action of a state prohibiting a
sale to the federal government, the constitutional grants of power
may be rendered nugatory, and the government is dependent.for
its practical existence upon the will of a state, or even upon that
of a private citizen. This cannot be. No one doubts the existence
in the state governments of the right of eminent domain ; a right
distinct from and paramount to the right of ultimate ownership.
It grows out of the necessities of their being, not out of the tenure
by which lands are held. It may be exercised though the lands
are not held by grant from the government, either mediately or
immediately, and independent of the consideration whether they
would escheat to the government in case of a failure of heirs. The
right is the offspring of political necessity, and it is inseparable
from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law: Vattel, ch. 20, 34; Bynkershoek, lib. 2, c. 15; Kent's Coin. 338-40;
Cooley on Const. Lim. 584, et seq. But it is no more necessary
for the exercise of the powers of a state government than it is for
the exercise of the conceded powers of the federal government.
That government is as sovereign within its sphere as the states are
within theirs. True, its sphere is limited. Certain subjects only
are committed to it, but its power over those subjects is as full and
complete as is the power of the states over the subjects to which
their sovereignty extends. The power is not changed by its
transfer to another holder.
But if the right of eminent domain exists in the federal government, it is a right which may be exercised within the states, so far
as is necessary to the enjoyment of the powers conferred upon it
by the Constitution. In Ableman v. .Booth, 21 How. 523, Chief
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Justice TANEY described in plain langdage the complex nature of our
government and the existence of two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, each of them restricted in
its powers, and each, within its sphere of action prescribed by the
Constitution of the United States, independent of the other.
Neither is under the necessity of applying to the other for permission to exercise its lawful powers. Within its own sphere it may
employ all the agencies for exerting them which are appropriate
or necessary, and which are not forbidden by the law of its being.
When the power to establish post-offices and to create courts within
the states was conferred upon the federal government, included in
it was authority to obtain sites for such offices and for court-houses,
and to obtain them by such means as were known and appropriate.
The right of eminent domain was one of those means well known
when the Constitution was adopted, and employed to obtain lands
for public uses. Its existence, therefore, in the grantee of that
power ought not to be questioned. The Constitution itself contains an implied recognition of it beyond what may justly be implied
from the express grants. The fifth amendment contains a provision that private property shall not be taken, for public use without just co.mpensation. What is that but an implied assertion that
on making just compensation it may be taken? In Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, p. 526, it is said : "So far as the general government may deem it important to appropriate lands or
other property for its own purposes, and to enable it to perform
its functions, as must sometimes be necessary in the case of forts,
light-houses, aid military posts or roadsP and other conveniences
and necessities of government, the general government may exercise the authority as well within the states as within the territory
under its exclusive jurisdiction, and its right to do so may be supported by the same reasons which support the right in any case;
that is to say, the absolute necessity that the means in the government for performing its functions and perpetuating its existence
should not be liable to be controlled or defeated by the want of consent of private parties or of any other authority." We refer, also,
to Trombley v. Rumphrey, 23 Michigan 471; 10 Peters 723;
Dickey v. Turnpike Co., 7 Dana 113 ; McCullough v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 429.
It is true, this power of the-federal government has not heretofore been exercised adversely, but the non-user of a power does
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not disprove its existence. In some instances the states, by virtue
of their own right of eminent domain, have condemned lands for
the use of the general government, and such condemnations have
been sustained by their courts, without, however, denying the right
of the United States to act independently of the states. Such
was the ruling in Gilmer v. Lime Point,18 Cal. 229, where lands
were condemned by a proceeding in a state court and under a state
law for an United States fortification. A similar decision was
made in Burt v. The Merchants' Insurance Co., 106 Mass. 856,
where land was taken under a state law as a site for a post-office
and sub-treasury building. Neither of these cases denies the right
of the federal government to have lands in the states condemned
for its uses under its own power and by its own action. The question was whether the state could take lands for any other public use
than that of the state. In Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471,
a different doctrine was asserted, founded, we think, upon better
reason. The proper view of the right of eminent domain seems to be
that it is a right belonging to a sovereignty to take private property
for its own public use and not for the use of another. Beyond that,
there exists no necessity, which alone is the foundation of the right.
If the United States have the power, it must be complete in itself.
It can neither be enlarged nor diminished by a state. Nor can
any state prescribe the manner in which it must be exercised. The
consent of a state can never be a condition precedent to its enjoyment. Such: consent is needed only, if at all, for the transfer of
jurisdiction and of the right of exclusive legislation after the land
shall have been acquired.
It may, therefore, fairly be concluded that the proceeding in the
case we have in hand was a proceeding by the United States
government in its own right and by virtue of its own eminent
domain. The Act of Congress of March 2d 1872 (17 Stats. at
Large 39), gave authority to the secretary of the treasury to
purchase a central and suitable site in the city of Cincinnati, Ohio,
for the erection of a building for the accommodation of the United
States courts, custom-house, United States depository, post-office,
internal revenue and pension offices, at a cost not exceeding
$i00,000, and a proviso to the act declared that no money should
be expended in the purchase until the state of Ohio should cede
its jurisdiction over the site and relinquish to the United States
the right to tax the property. The authority here given was to
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purchase. If that were all, it might be doubted whether the right
'of eminent domain was intended to be invoked. It is true, the
words "to purchase" might be construed as including the power
to acquire by condemnation, for, technically, purchase includes all
modes of acquisition other than that of descent. But generally in
statutes as in common use, the word is employed in a sense not
technical, only as meaning acquisition by contract between the
parties, without governmental interference. That Congress intended more than this is evident, however, in view of the subsequent
and amendatory act passed June 10th 1872, which made an appropriation "for the purchase at private sale or by condemnation of
the ground for a site" for the building. These provisions, connected as they are, manifest a clear intention to confer upon the
secretary of the treasury power to acquire the grounds needed by
the exercise of the national right of eminent domain, or by private
purchase, at his discretion. Why speak of condemnation at all
if Congress had not in view an exercise of the right of eminent
domain and did not intend to confer upon the secretary the right
to invoke it ?
But it is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs in error, that the
Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the proceeding. There is
nothing in the Acts of 1872, it is true, that directs the process by
'which the contemplated condemnation should be effected, or which
expressly authorizes a proceeding in the Circuit Court to secure it.
Doubtless Congress might have provided a mode of taking the
land, and determining the compensation tobe made, which would
have been exclusive of all other modes. They might have prescribed in what tribunal, or by what agents the taking and the
ascertainment of the just compensation should be accomplished.
The mode might have been by a commission, or it might have been
referred expressly to the Circuit Court; but this we think was not
necessary. The investment of the secretary of the treasury with
power to obtain the land by condemnation, without prescribing the
mode of exercising the power, gave him also the power to obtain
it by any means that were competent to adjudge a condemnation.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred upon the Circuit Courts of
the United States jurisdiction of all suits at common law,'or in
equity, when the United States, or any officer thereo4, suing under
the authority of any Act of Cbngress, are plaintiffs. If, then, a
proceeding to take land for public uses by condemnation may be a
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suit at common law, jurisdiction of it is vested in the Circuit Court.
That it is a "suit" admits of no question. In Jreston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 464, Chief Justice MARSHALL, speaking for this court,
said, 4"the term (suit) is certainly a very comprehensive one, and
is understood to apply to any proceeding in a court of justice, by
which an individual pursues that remedy which the law affords.
The modes of proceeding may be various, but if a right is litigated
in a court of justice, the proceeding by which the decision of the
court is sought, is a suit." A writ of prohibition has, therefore,
been held to be a suit; so has a writ of right, of which the Circuit
Court has jurisdiction (Green v. Liter, 8 Cranch 229); so has
habeas corpus (Holmes v. Jamion, 14 Pet. 564). When in the
11th sect. of the Judiciary Act of 1789, jurisdiction was given to
the circuit courts of suits of a civil nature at common law, or in
equity, it was intended to embrace not merely suits which the common law recognised as among its old and settled proceedings, but
suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined,
as distinguished from rights in equity, as well as suits in admiralty.
The right of eminent domain always was a right at common law.
It was not a right in equity, nor was it even the creature of a
statute. The time of its exercise may have been prescribed by
statute, but the right itself was superior to any statute. That it
was not enforced through the agency of a jury is immaterial, for
many civil, as well as criminal, proceedings at common law were
without a jury. It is difficult, then, to see why a proceeding to
take land, in virtue of the government's eminent domain, and
determining the compensation to be made for it is not, within the
meaning of the statute, a suit at common law, when initiated in a
court. It is an attempt to enforce a legal right. It is quite immaterial that Congress has not enacted that the compensation shall
be ascertained in a judicial proceeding. That ascertainment is in
its nature at least quasi-judicial. Certainly no other mode than a
judicial trial has been provided.
It is argued that the assessment of property for the purpose of
taking it, is in its nature like the assessment of its value for the
purpose of taxation. It is said they are both valuations of the
property to be made as the legislature may prescribe, to enable
the government, in the one case, to take the whole of it, and in
the other to take a part of it for public uses, and it.is argued that
no one but Congress could prescribe in either case, that the valu-

KOHIL v. THE UNITED STATES.

ation should be made in a judicial tribunal, or in a judicial proceeding, although it is admitted the legislature might authorize
the valuation to be thus made in either case. If the supposed
analogy be admitted it proves nothing. Assessments for taxation
are specially provided for, and a mode is prescribed. No other is,
therefore, admissible. But there is no special provision for ascertaining the just compensation to be made for land taken. That
is-left to the ordinary processes of the law, and hence, as the government is a suitor for the property, under a claim of legal right to
take it, there appears to be no reason for holding that the proper
circuit court has not jurisdiction of the suit, under the general grant
of jurisdiction made by the Act of 1789.
The second assignment of error is that the Circuit Court refused
the demand of the defendants below, now plaintiffs in error, for a
separate trial of the value of their estate in the property. They
were lessees of one of the parcels sought to be taken, and they
demanded a separate trial of the value of their interest, but the
court overruled their demand and required that the jury should
appraise the value of the lot or parcel, and that the lessees should
in the same trial try the value of their leasehold estate therein. In
directing .the course of the trial the court required the lessor and
the lessees each separately to state the nature of their *estates to
the jury, the lessor to offer his testimony separately, and the lessees
theirs, and then the government to answer the testimony of the
lessor and the lessees, and the court instructed the jury to find and
return separately the value of the estates of the. lessor and the
lessees. It is of this the lessees complain. They contend that
whether the proceeding is to be treated as founded on the national
right of eminent domain, or on that of the state (its consent having
been given by the enactment of the state legislature of February
15th 1873, 70 Ohio Laws 36, sect. 1), it was required to conform
to the practice and proceedings in the courts of the state in like
cases. This requirement, it is said, was made by the Act of
Congress of June 1st 1872 (17 Stats. at L. 522). But admitting
that the court was bound to conform to the practice and proceedings
in the state courts in like cases, we do not perceive that any error
was committed. Under the laws of Ohio it was regular to institute
a joint proceeding against all the owners of lots proposed to be
taken (Giesy v. . W. & T. .Bailroad Co., 4 Ohio St. 308), but
the 8th section of the state statute gave to "the owner or owners
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of each separate parcel" the right to a separate trial. In such a
case, therefore, a separate trial is the mode-of proceeding in the
state courts. The statute treats all the owners of a jarcel as one
party, and gives to them collectively a trial separate from the trial
of the issues between the government and the owners of other
parcels. It bath this extent, no more. The court is not required
to allow a separate trial to each owner of an estate or interest in
each parcel, and no consideration of justice to those owners would
be subserved by it. The Circuit Court, therefore, gave to the
plaintiffs in error all, if not more than all, they had a right to ask.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
FIELD, J., dissenting.-Assuming that the majority of the court
are correct in the doctrine announced in the opinion just read, that
the right of eminent domain within the states, using those terms not
as synonymous with the ultimate dominion or title to property, but
as indicating merely the right to take private property for public uses,
belongs to the federal government to enable it to execute the powers
conferred by the Constitution-; and that any other doctrine would
subordinate, in important particulars, the national authority to the
caprice of individuals or the will of state legislatures, it appears to
me that provision for the exercise of the right must first be made
by legislation. The federal courts have no inherent jurisdiction
of a proceeding instituted for the condemnation of property, and I
do not find any statute of Congress conferring upon them such authority. The Judiciary Act of 1789 only invests the circuit courts
of the United States with jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the
state courts, of suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity;
and these terms have reference to those classes of cases which are
conducted by regular pleadings between parties, according to the
established doctrines prevailing at the time in the jurisprudence of
England. The proceeding to ascertain the value of property which
,the government may deem necessary to the execution of its powers,
'and thus the compensation to be made for its appropriation, is not
a suit at common law or in equity, but an inquisition for the ascertainment of a particular fact as preliminary to the taking, and all
that is required is that the proceeding shall be conducted in some
fair and just mode, to be provided by law, either with or without
the intervention of a jury, opportunity being afforded to parties
interested to present e'idence as to the value of the property and
VOL. XXIV.-66
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.to be heard thereon. The proceeding by the states in the exercise
of their right of eminent domain, is often! had before commissioners
of assessment or special boards appointed for that purpose. It can
hardly be doubted that Congress might provide for inquisition as
to the value of property to be taken by similar instrumentalities,
and yet if the proceeding be a suit at common law, the intervention
of a jury would be required by the seventh amendment to the Constitution.
I think that the decision of the majority of the court in including the proceeding in this case under the general designation of a
suit at common law, with which the circuit courts of the United
States are invested by the eleventh secition of the Judiciary Act,
goes beyond previous adjudications and is in conflict with them.
Nor am I able to agree with the majority in their opinion, or at
least intimation, that the authority to purchase carries with it autbority to acquire by condemnation. The one supposes an agree.
ment upon valuation and a voluntary conveyance of the property;
the other implies a compulsory taking and a contestation as to the
value: Beekman v. The Saratoga & Sce'neotay Railroad(yo., 3
Paige 75; Railroad Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Batt. 465; . Willyard
v. Hamilton, 7 Ham. (0.) 458; LiuingIton v. The Mayor of New
York, 7 Wend. 85 ; Koppikus v. State Capitol Commissionersr16
Cal. 249.
For these Yeasons I am compelled to dissent from the opinion
of the court.

United States Distriet Court, Western District of Tennessee.
EX PARTE WADDY THOMPSON.1
The United States courts have power under the writ of habeas corpus'to discharge persons from the custody of state officers, where it appears that they are
held under a state law which seeks to punish them for executing a law of the
United States, or where the act for which they are held was done in pursuance of
the process of a Federal court.
But where a party Is In custody of a state officer under an indictment for larceny and sets up as a justification for the act complained of a writ of replevin issued from a United States court, the latter court will on habeas corpus inquire into
the fact whether its writ was fraudulently obtained for the purpose of carrying off
I We are indebted for this case to -L. B. McFarlaid, Esq., of counsel for respondent.-ED. Am. LAw RE.
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the property, and if satisfied of that fact, will remand the relator to the custody
of the state officer.
A writ regular on its face is a justification to the officer to whom it is addressed
for everything that he may lawfully do under such an authority, but this rule does
not extend to a party who has procured the writ by fraud.

THIS was a writ of habcas corpus addressed to the sheriff of
Shelby county, Tennessee, requiring him to produce before the
judge of this district the body of Waddy Thompson, alleged to be
unlawfully detained by the respondent. In obedience to the writ
the sheriff produced the petitioner, and returned .that he held him
by virtue of a capias issued upon indictments for larceny and horsestealing found by the grand jury of Shelby county. This return
was neither traversed nor confessed and avoided as contemplated
by the Revised Statutes, but the facts upon which Thompson
claimed his discharge were substantially as follows:That Mrs. Francis Wilkerson, a citizen of Missouri, having a
claim to the possession of certain goods and chattels unlawfully
detained by certain parties in Memphis, Tennessee, and having
failed to obtain the same upoh repeated demands, or to receive any
satisfactory accounting therefor, on October 20th 1874, instituted
an action of replevin in the Circuit Court of the United States
for this district, intrusting the inauguration and conduct of the
suit to one Arnett, an attorney of St. Louis, to whom she gave a
power of attorney authorizing such suit; and to be aided, if
necessary, by the relator, who was her son-in-law, and who also
held a general power of attorney from her in relation to her matters
of business ; that Arnett made the oath required by statute, and
gave a bond, with Elijah Smith and Benjamin F. Carroll as
sureties, whereupon process was issued requiring the marshal to
take possession of the property in question ind deliver it to the
plaintiff, or her agent; that the writ was partially executed by the
marshal taking possession of a portion of the goods and delivering
them to Arnett. The petition further set forth that one iendrix,
one of the defendants in the replevin, made oath before a clerk of
this court of the insufficiency of the bond, and obtained from the
district judge an order suspending further proceedings; that horses
and other property which had been placed in the possession of
Arnett, were by his direction placed on a steamboat for the purpose of deliveritig them to his principal in Missouri; that these
goods were landed on the Arkansas shore, a few miles above Meinphis, when Hendrix, accompanied by armed companions, procured
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a steam tug, boarded his boat, and, by intimilation, induced Arnett
and the relator to return the property that had been delivered to
them by the marshal, under an agreement that the title to the same
should be settled by civil suits then pending. The goods and
horses were accordingly brought back and delivered to the defendants in the replevin suit; that, notwithstanding the writ had been
duly issued by the clerk of this court, and executed by the marshal
of this district, the defendants in the replevin suit procured indictments against the relator, Arnett, and the sureties upon the bond
for perjury and larceny ; that these indictments were intended to
frustrate and delay the plaintiff in the replevin suit in the prosecution of her remedy by intimidating relator, and thereby to oust
the Circuit Court of the United States "ofits rightful jurisdiction
over this suit, and to drive the plaintiff to a remedy in the state court
where by local influence defendants hoped to obtain an unfair advantage ; that relator having given bonds upon these indictments, and
returned to his home in Missouri, the firm of Hendrix, Carter & Co.,
defendants in the replevin suit, instituted an action against the relator and Mrs. Wilkerson, for malicious prosecution, in bringing
this action of replevin, and that in this suit the property which
she was .ttempting to recover was attached. He further charged
that the criminal court had no jurisdiction to try him upon these
indictments, and that he was unjustly restrained of his liberty ,
that if guilty of any wrongful act whatever it was against- the
peace, and dignity of the United States. He further claimed that
he had a perfect right to do everything that was done towards the
taking of the property named in the replevin, and was thereforb
not guilty of larceny or horse-stealing, and that the United States
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over; him for the punishment of
the offence, if any there be.
T. ff. Brown, W. . Folkes and J. . Du Bose, for the relator.
L. E. Wright, attorney-general, Li. B. Horrgan and L. P.
McFarland,for the sheriff.
BRowN, District Judge.-It is claimed by the relator that as
the sheriff made no answer to the facts set forth in this petitiop
they are to be taken as true, and that he is therefore entitled to
his discharge. I think, however, be misapprehends the law upoi
this point. The petition is simply the basis upon which the writ
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is issued. No copy of it is required to be served upon the respondent in the writ, who is required to make his return to the writ
itself, and not by way of answer to the petition, which has performed its office as soon as the fiat is signed. A return may be
traversed or confessed and avoided by way of affidavit or oral
testimony, but I know of no practice requiring an answer to be
made to the petition itself. It would have been proper for the
relator to confess and avoid the return by repeating in his denial
the facts set up in the petition. This is evidently contemplated
by section 760 hereafter quoted, though I know of no practice requiring it to be done. The testimony was taken as if the issue
had been made upon the return, and as no objection was interposed
to this course until the argument of the case, I shall proceed to
dispose of it as if an issue had been made by the pleading.
-By section 753 of the Revised Statutes, "the writ of habeas
corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail, unless where
he is in custody * * * for an act done or omitted, in pursuance
of a law of the United States, or of an order, process or decree
of a court or judge thereof." Although the words used are those
of exclusion, there is no doubt of the power of this court to issue
a writ of habeas corpus in cases falling within the above provision.
By section 754 application must be made "by complainant in
writing, signed by the person for whose relief it is intended, settingforth the facts concerning the detention of the party restrained,
in whose custody he is detained, and by virtue of what claim or
authority, if known."
By section 760 the petitioner "may deny any of the facts set
forth in the return, or may allege any other facts that may be
material in the case. Said denials or allegations shall be under
oath."
By section 761 the judge "shall proceed in a summary way to
determine the facts of the case by hearing the testimony and argument, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice
require."
The section first above quoted is substantially a re-enactment
of the Act of 1833, commonly known as the " Force Bill," and
was adopted in view of the nullification laws of South Carolina,
by which an attempt had been made to punish officers of the
United States for executing the laws of Congress within that
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state. But it is now settled that this act gives relief to one in
state custody not only when he is held under a law of the state
which seeks expressly to punish him for executing a law or process
of the United States, but also when he is in such custody under a
general law of the state, which applies to all persons equally,
where it appears he is justified for the act done, because done in
pursuance of the process of a United States court ( United States
ex rel. Roberts v. Jailer of Fayette County, 2 Abbott U.
S. 277). At the same time the power given to the Federal
courts thus to arrest the arm of the state authorities, and to discharge a person held by them is one of great delicacy, and should
only be exercised where it clearly appears that justice demands it.
Such power has rarely been invoked, except under circumstances
tending to show strongly that the state was about to use its authority to oppress the party imprisoned in defiance of the laws 5f
the general government. Nothing could render the act more justly
odious than to permit the writ of habeas corpus to be employed to
relieve a party from the legal consequences of crime against. the
sovereignty of a state.
If it appears, however, that the relator was justified by the process of this court in doing what he has done, the sections above
quoted authorize and require his discharge. The testimony taken
at considerable length reveals substantially the following facts:
The relator, who was son-in-law of Mrs. Wilkerson, holding a
general power of attorney from her, came to Memphis from Missouri, in the month of October 1874, accompanied by one Arnett,
an attorney-at-law at St. Louis, for the purpose of asserting her
claim to the property covered by the writ of replevin. With the
view of hastening the disposition of the case, it was conceded by
the learned counsel for the state, that the relator, in. good faith,
supposed that Mrs. Wilkerson was entitled to the possession of
the property covered by the writ. On arriving at Memphis, he
and Arnett put up at the Commercial Hotel, where they first met
Carroll, who afterwards became one of the sureties upon the replevin
bond. * * * * *
[Here the learned judge reviewed the testimony as to the means
used in getting worthless securities on the replevin bond.]
After one or two ineffectual efforts he finally procured the services of an attorney, who drew an affidavit sworn to by Arnett,
claiming the possession of the stock of liquors, and .safe and con-
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tents in the store of Hendrix, Carter & Co., the entire stock in
trade of a firm of nurserymen, and three horses belonging to parties
not connected in any way with the other defendants, though the
horses had been purchased of Hendrix, Carter & Co. It may also
be observed here that Hendrix, Carter & Co. were in no way connected with the owners of the nursery, and that plaintiff proceeding
properly would have been compelled to bring at least three, and
probably four or five separate suits to recover possession of these
distinct parcels. Upon this affidavit a sweeping writ of replevin
was issued against defendants, commanding the marshal to take
possession of all the property named in the writ, and to deliver the
same to the plaintiff or her agent. Taking Arnett and his two sureties to the clerk's office, a bond was signed, prior to the issuing of the
writ, by Arnett, as attorney for the plaintiff, by Homer B. Carroll,
signing his name as Benjamin F. Carroll, and by Elijah Smith,
whose true name, and, indeed, whose very existence is unknown.
Each of these sureties swore that he was worth the sum of $30,000
in real estate in Shelby and Tipton counties. This was done in
the presence and by direction of Thompson, who knew perfectly
their utter insolvency. Shortly afterward Arnett advised Carroll
to get out of town as soon as possible, which he proceeded to do by
hiring a skiff to take him across the river. To secure the speedy
service of the writ and transportation of the property, relator
hired a steamboat plying between Memphis and Mound City,
Arkansas; to wait over her usual timge of departure, promising to
pay ten dollars per hour for her detention. Deputies were dispatched from the marshal's office to different parts of the city
where the property covered by the writ was lying. Six furniture
wagons were-sent to the nursery and about a thousand pots of
flowers, besides knives, forks and spoons and other articles were
loaded upon them and hurried away to the steamer, which was
lying in waiting to take them across the river. Several horses,
were seized by another deputy, who at once drove them on board
the steamboat. Fifty or sixty drays were sent to the store of
Htendrix, Carter & Co, for the purpose of removing their entire
stock in a similar way, and loading it upon the boat. The relator
formerly had a desk in their establishment, knew the office hours
of the partners, and instructed the marshal not to go there until
the book-keeper had gone away and locked the safe, and the
Whei the marshal
steamer was on the point of departure.
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announced his intention to Hendrix of seizing all the goods in his
establishment, Hendrix asked for a little time, went to the clerk's
office to look at the bond, satisfied himself the sureties were insolvent, and made affidavit of the fact, when the district judge was
telegraphed to to stop proceedings. The marshal refused to place
the property on the boat, but put custodians in charge during the
night. His suspicions were excited none too soon. Great anxiety
was manifested by Thompson to get possession of this stock, but
finding himself foiled the boat was comp elled to put off without it.
It proceeded to Mound City about sun-down, with Thompson,
Arnett and Carroll, who had dismissed his skiff, on board. After
arriving at Mound City, some of the defendants made up a party,
hired a steam tug, went in pursuit, and compelled the return of
the property. Relator afterwards returned to Memphis, saw the
counsel employed by Hendrix, Carter & Co., confessed to him the
bond was bogus and fraudulent; said they had him where he
meant to get them, and promised if they would let him out he
would furnish information to hold the clerk and marshal. I take
pleasure in saying there is not the slightest evidence to show that
either of these officers or their deputies acted corruptly or in bad
faith, although in view of the magnitude of the bond a little more
care in approving it would have been commendable. The writ of
replevin was soon after dismissed and his claim to the proplerty
abandoned.
This is but a bare outline of the facts fully proved-facts which
the relator made but feeble attempt to deny. I am forced to the
conclusion that it is a case of gross and infamous fraud practised
upon the court.
It is claimed by the relator, however, that admitting this to be
true, he is still entitled to his discharge, inasmuch as the writ of
replevin was valid upon its face. There is no question that a writ
valid upon its face will protect the officer executing it, notwithstanding it may have been irregularly issued, or may be voidable
for want of jurisdiction. There is a clear distinction, however, between the officer who executes the writ and the party who procures
it to be issued; as against the latter, it may be shown to be void
from facts not appearing upon its face. From a multitude of cases
drawing this distinction, I cite the following:
Lavacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 173,; Lodes v. Pheps, 13 Wend.
48; Adkin v. Brewer, 3 Cow. 206; Whitney v. Schenfel, 1 Den.
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594; State v. Weed, 1 Fost. 262; Rogers v.
ulliner, 6 Wend.
597; Taylor v. Iresc, 7 Cow. 249.
By the Code of Tennessee, before a writ of replevin can be issued a bond must be filed in double the value of the property covered by the writ. Whether the writ is totally void without such
bond it is perhaps unnecessary to consider. There is no doubt
that a writ of attachment iTsued without such bond where the statute requires it, is wholly void (see Drake on Attachments, &c.), and
it is presumed that the same rule would be held to apply to writs
of replevin, although in some states, where a bond is not required
before the issuing of the writ, it is held that the writ is not thereby
invalidated, if the bond is executed before the property is delivered
to the plaintiff. There is a clear distinction between the statutes
which require the bond to be executed before the property is delivered over, and those which require it before the issuing of the
writ. In this case no bond was ever given. It is not merely a
case of insufficiency of sureties, which may be renewed by order
of the court. The relator procured the execution of the bond by
sureties, whom he knew to be utterly irresponsible and at least
one of whom forged the signature of'a fictitious person.
The position assumed by relator is that if the writ upon its face
authorized the taking, which is the subject of the larceny for which
he is indicted, he "is entitled to his discharge, notwithstanding
the writ was procured by perjury, and used for the purpose of
committing a larceny. Counsel cannot have fully apprehended the
consequences of this doctrine. May a deputy marshal, holding
a eapias of this court, deliberately murder the party he is seeking
to arrest ? There is no general power in the Federal courts to
punish murder, and if discharged from the custody of the state, his
crime would go practically unpunished. This court I think is
bound to inquire into the legality of the use as well as the validity
of the process itself. This was the view evidently taken by the
learned judge for the District of Kentucky in the Roberts case
above cited.
In Commonwealth v. Low, Thacher's Criminal Cases 477, it
was held that if a man, having a right of action, makes use of a
process which he knows he has no right to adopt, to get the property of his debtor, and with intent to defraud him, it is larceny.
It is well settled that a combination of two or more to accomVoL. XXIV.-67
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plish a lawful purpose by unlawful means is indictable as a conspiracy. Says Lord HALE (P. 0. 507): "A. hath the mind to get
the goods, of B. into his possession, privately delivers an ejectmefit,
and obtains judgment against a casual ejector, -and thereby gets
possession and takes the goods; if it were animofurandi, it is larceny." So Lord COKE (3 Inst. 108): "If a man seeing the horse
of B. in his pasture, and having a mind to steal him, cometh to the
sheriff, and pretending the horse to be his, obtaineth the horse to
be delivered to him by replevin, yet this is a felonious and fraudulent taking."
I have not lost sight of the concession in this case that relator
supposed that he was entitled to the possession of this property.
The question here is not whether he was entitled to the possession of this property; nor whether he was guilty of larceny
in obtaining possession; not even whether he was entitled to
possession, but whether he was justified by his writ in obtaining
this possession. Now, nothing is better settled in the law of trespass than that an officer entitled to levylupon property becomes a
trespasser ab initio by an abuse of the process. 'I am satisfied in
this case that the relator cominenced this suit not for the purpose
of asserting a bond fide claim to the property, but of spiriting it
away under the forms of law, and disposing of it before proceedings
could be taken for its reclamation. It would be a strange interpretation of'tbe 'law, if, after having been guilty of forgery, fraud
and subornation of perjury in procuring the process of this court,
he could still claim to be protected by it in carrying out his schemes.
I hold, then, that, although the marshal was protected by this writ
in what he did in execution thereof, yet as to the relator in this
case, it was fraudulent and void, and that so far from being entitled
to protection by this court, his case should be laid before the next
grand jury of this district, for such action as it may see fit to take,
and the district attorney is directed to see that this is done. Provided, however, that no action be taken on any indictment until he
shall have been discharged by a state court.
It results that the prisoner must be remanded to the custody of
the sheriff of Shelby county.
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Supreme Court of licidgan.
WILLIAM" WEAVER v. TiE PEOPLE.
A judge has power to su-pend sentence, where the circumstances, in his opinion, render the offence trifling and the law has imposed no minimum punishment
for it.

In general, where a sentence his been omitted by the judge who tried the case,
another judge may impose the proper sentence at a subsequent time.
But where sentence has been suspended by a judge under circumstances that indicate his opinion that no punishment should be inflicted, as, e..g., where he has
discharged the prisoner on his own recognisanee in a nominal amount, a subsequent sentence by a different judge is erroneous and will be reversed.

ERRO to Van Buren Circuit.
Weaver, on the 8th day of July 1874, pleaded guilty to a
charge of malicious injury to a dwelling. The case was pending
in the Circuit Court for the county of Van Buren, and the plea
was put in before Ion. J. W. ST0NE, Circuit Judge. On the same
eay Judge STONE suspended sentence until the first (lay of the next
term, which was the first Monday of October 1874, the respondent
being allowed to give his own recognisance to appear at that day,
in the sum of one hundred dollars. The sentence was not further
suspended, nor the recognisance forfeited, and the defendant was
not called up for sentence at the return term, but continued at
liberty. On the 25th day of October 1875, Judge TENNANT,.a judge
of another circuit sitting temporarily, sentenced Weaver to two
years and six months imprisonment in the state prison. On this
error is brought.
W Scott .Beebe, for plaintiff in error.
Andrew J. Smith, Attorney-General, for the People.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-It is not necessary in this case to discuss the
power of a different judge to give sentence where it has been
omitted, and where it does not appear that such omission was
designed to interfere with punishment. There has been some
dispute as to the best course to pursue under such circumstances.
Lord IIALE, not considering the abstract question, said it was not
his custom to give such sentences in cases of felony. But generally the question seems to become important in view of some
action or expression of the trial judge indicating his sentiments.
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It is said with much force that inasmuch as there can be no sentence without the joint belief of the jury in the prisoner's guilt,
and of the judge in the deserts of the offender, where he has any
discretion to exercise, the views of the judge are to be respected.
In the present case there was no fixed penalty. It might be
imprisonment in the state prison, or it might be a short imprisonment in the county jail, or a fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars, but with no minimum amount required to be imposed.
In other words, it was recognised by the legislature that such
offences might be of trifling enormity, and not worthy of serious
notice.
Sentences may be suspended for various purposes. It may be
for the purpose of allowing. steps to be taken for a new trial or
other relief, or it may be with a view of letting the offender go
without punishment. The release of a defendant on his own recognisanee and without sureties, in a merely nominal amount,
signifies usually the latter purpose. It at least is a plain assdrtion of the judge that he did not regard the offence as one that
should receive a serious punishment. The failure to take steps
during the October Term of 1874, was a practical abandonment
of the prosecution, and corroborates the opinion that such must
have been understood as the object of the suspension, -and as the
record stands it is fairly to be inferred it was intentional. To
sentence a prisoner to the penitentiary under such circumstances,
and when the trial judge has distinctly said he ought not to be so
sentenced, is not supplying his omissions, but is overruling his decision. This we think is not admissible, and the sentence was unauthorized, and the judgment must be reversed, and the prisoner discharged.

Court of Appeals of New York.
WILLIAM LEETCH, RESPONDENT, v. ATLANTIC MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., APPELLANT.
In all contracts of marine insurance there are certain implied conditions which
are of the same force as if written in the policy, and are distinguishable from
mere representations.
Among these conditions, in case of an insurance on cargo, is that it shall be
stowed in a safe and proper manner and in the usual and customary place for the
carriage of goods of the kind insured. Any breach of this condition by which the
risk is varied and the perils increased avoids the policy.

LEETCH v. ATLANTIC M1UTUAL INS. CO.
The testimony of experts and particularly of underwriters is always admissible
upon the question of the materiality of circumstances affecting the risk.
Gold being stowed in the rear of the vessel under the cargo, and the testimony
being clear that that was not the customary place and was a place of greater hazard than the cabin, where coin is usually stowed, the judge should have directed
the jury, as a matter of law, that that was a material variation of the risk.

THIS was an action on a policy of marine insurance. The material facts were that gold was shipped at Laguna, consigned to
New York, and was, at the time of lading, placed in the rear of the
vessel, outside the cabin and under the ballast. At Minatitlan a
cargo of mahogany was taken on board and filled the hold, thereby
rendering the gold inaccessible. The vessel met with disaster and
was abandoned at sea. The gold could not be reached and was
not saved. Subsequently the vessel was found and towed into
port, but on unloading no gold was found.

Samuel faizd and Win. G. Choate, for appellant.
TV J. A. Puller and .E. L. _ancher, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALLEN, J.-The question of most prominence, as it is the most
important in this case, is as to the validity of the policy upon the
gold, and the rulings of the learned judge at the trial in respect
to it. There is no conflict of evidence or substantial dispute as to
the facts upon which its validity is challenged by the defendant.
The claim is that the specie was not stowed on board the vessel
in the usual and customary place for the carriage of freight of that
description, but that it was placed in an unusual part of the vessel,
by which the peril was greatly increased and the risk essentially
varied from that assumed by the underwriter. The evidence of
the shipmasters, given upon the trial, was uniform, that the usual
place for the carriage of coin or specie of any kind was either in
some proper place in the cabin or in that part of the run of the
vessel immediately under the cabin, and -accessible from it by an
opening in the floor with a trap properly fitted, so that it might
be at all times under the immediate watch and care of the captain,
and only accessible from the cabin. The masters of vessels, who
were examined as witnesses upon this subject, bad been engaged
in trade to Mexican and South American ports, as well as to other
ports and places, and all agreed that the usual and proper place
for the safe-keeping of coin, carried as freight, was* either in or
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under the cabin, as stated. It was proved by one or more of the
witnesses, and not disputed, that the only exception to this usage
-was when specie was taken out of the country clandestinely, in
violation of the revenue laws, and to evade the payment of export
duties, when it was sometimes concealed among the cargo or in
other parts of the vessel, but never under the cargo. In such case,
as soon as the vessel was at sea and the pilot had left the ship, the
coin was invariably taken from its temporary place of concealment
and deposited in the usual place. The same witnesses, and the
only witnesses upon the subject who were experienced as navigators
and masters of vessels, agreed that a deposit of coin under the
ballast or under the cargo was unusual and increased the hazards
and -risk of loss to which it was exposed. In case of disaster, it
was less accessible and could not be saved in whole or in part, as
it might under ordinary circumstances and as usually stowed.
This fact is so palpable, upon a mere statement of the different
modes and places of' stowage, that it needed not to be proved by
experts. It was not denied that while under the freight, especially
such as that laden on board the vessel in this instance, it was safer
from barratry or theft than when stowed in the usual place ; but
even in. such case, the risk of theft was greater when the vessel
was unladen, and during that process, from its liability, to be taken
by stevedores and others who would have access to it. The claim
of the plaintiff is that the gold was lost, not from the perils said to
be diminished by the stowage resorted to, but by that which was
confessedly increased. The gold, in the present instance, 'was
suffered to remain under the ballast from the time it was placed
there at Laguna, until the vessel sailed, and during the voyage
from that port to Minatitlan, and until the cargo of mahogany was
laden on board at the latter port. During all that time it is selfevident that it was exposed to equal if not greater peril from barratry and theft than if stowed in the usual place. There is no
evidence, except that of the plaintiff, that the gold was seen on
board the vessel after it was first laden at Laguna. Whether there
was any necessity for the stowage of the gold in the hold of the
vessel, outside of the cabin, while the vessel remained upon the
coast and at the ports of Laguna and Minatitlan, which would
justify a deviation from the usual course of lading, and of which
the underwriters might be presumed or were bound to have known,
and thereby to have assumed the varied risk, cannot be determined
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upon the present record. Thise questions were not tried or decided
by the trial court. The facts proved by these witnesses, and which
are not controverted by any witness upon the trial, clearly and
conclusively establish that the actual risk upon the gold was not
the same as it would have been if stowed in the usual place, and
that the risk of loss in case of disaster at sea, the peril by which
it is claimed the gold was lost, was increased.
In addition to this evidence, several underwriters were called as
experts, and they were unanimous in the opinion that the carriage
of specie under the ballast arid cargo did increase the risk, and
that the fact that it was so carried was material to be known by
an underwriter, and would affect his judgment as to accepting the
risk ; and, if accepted, the rate of premium. But a single underwriter was called by the plaintiff, and his"evidence did not detract
from the force of or conflict with that given in behalf of the defendant. •He testified that a stowage under the cargo would (in
his own language) "of course," in some respects, increase the risk
so far as the perils of the sea were concerned, and only diminish
it as against barratry or theft on the part of the mariners. He
also stated that when so stowed the risk would be different in
character and different in kind from what it would be if the gold
were stowed in the cabin or in the run immediately under the
cabin.
The plaintiff, himself a witness upon the trial, stated that he had
frequently shipped specie and carried it under the cargo and the
timbers, in oat sacks, in the cook's coppers, and almost everywhere
in the vessel where he deemed it most prudent, but he did not state
under what circumstances he had so carried it, or that it was usual
so to do, or that when so carried it was insured. Under objection
that he bad not shown himself competent to testify as an expert,
he was permitted to testify that in his opinion. the risk would not
be any greater for the safety of the specie whether stowed under
the cargo or in any other place on the vessel, and that it would be
safer under the cargo against barratry and theft. His testimony was
not in conflict with, but rather in corroboration of, the testimony
of the other witnesses, except in the statement that the gold was
equally safe in any part of the vessel. It is well settled that
the testimony of experts, and especially of underwriters, as such,
is admissible upon the question of materiality of circumstances affecting the risk: McLanahanv. The Universal Ins."Co., 1 Peters
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170; 3 Kent's Com. 284. When evidence of this character is
necessary for the reason that the fact is not sufficiently obvious to.
enable the court to decide it without aid, the testimony is to be
tieatcd as testimony of credible witnesses upon any other fact;
and if there is no conflict, the fact of materiality or immateriality
must be held as all the witnesses testify. If there is a difference of
opinion, it then becomes a question of fact for the jury. In every
contract of marine insurance there are certain implied stipulations
and conditions which are of the same obligatory force as between the
parties as if expressed in the policy, and make a part of the contract, and are distinguishable from mere representations: Arnould
on Ins., 4th ed., 589. Among the conditions in case of an insurance
upon cargo implied by law, is that it shall be stowed in a safe and
proper manner, and in the usual and customary place for the carriage of goods of the description insured, and any breach of this
warranty by which the risk is varied and the perils ihsured against
increased, vitiates the policy. A policy upon merchandise is vitiated by a breach of the implied warranty that the conveying ship
is seaworthy, although the shipper of the goods is innocent and has
no interest in the ship: Arnould on Ins. 591. The insurers, assuming risks which the insured is unwilling to bear, can only be held
to those risks which they have voluntarily and knowingly undertaken, and the insured has no right to substitute any others in the
place of those assumed: 2 Pars. on Ins. 2.; Hartley v. Buggin,
3 Doug. 39; Maryland Ins. Co. v. Le Boy, 7 Cranch 26. In
Blackett v. The Royal Ex. Assurance Co., 2 0. & J. 244, Lord
LYNDHURST, 0. B., says : " On an insurance upon goods, the underwriter is entitled, in general, to expect that they shall be carried in that part of the ship usually appropriated to the stowage of
goods, not in a more dangerous part," and adds: "If be were to
be made answerable for extraordinary peril, he would be answerable for a peril he had not contemplated, and for which he had not
received an adequate compensation." To this principle may be
traced the rule which excludes deck cargoes from the protection of
an ordinary policy of insurance: 1 Pars. on Marine Ins. 529. In
Brooks v. The Oriental Ins. Co., 7 Pick. 259, the underwriter was
held not to be liable upon a valued policy upon a ship for a hawser lost overboard, -which was stowed in the boat on deck instead
of having been stowed in the-hold with the cables on the passage,
the court saying that it was a matter of common information that
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it should have been stowed in the hold. Here we have the uncontradicted evidence of an established usage as to the proper place
for the stowage of gold and the patent and obvious fact that the
usual place is the safer place for carrying it. It is only where
there is a doubt as to the materiality of a representation or of any
deviation or change of risk, that it falls exclusively within the
province of a jury. A nonsuit was sustained by the court in bane,
in the Taunton Copper Co. v. The _Merchants' Ins. G'o., 22 Pick.
108, upon the ground that the merchandise, which was copper in
pigs, had been stowed upon deck instead of being put under deck,
and this, notwithstanding a general usage for forty years to carry
goods not liable to be injured by dampness on deck, was proved.
The court were of the opinion that the usage stopped in limine,
and that the insured should have proved, in addition, that it was
usual for underwriters to pay for goods when carried on deck.
The plaintiff's claim and proof in this case is equally defective.
There is no pretence that any underwriter has ever paid for coin
lost when stowed in this way, and insured by a policy in the ordinary form. The question in iBickards v. M1-urdock, 10 B. & C.
527, was as to the materiality of a direction from the insured to
the broker, to wait thirty days after the receipt of the letter giving
the directions before effecting the insurance. It was held that
evidence of the underwriter's opinion was properly received, and
that even without it the jury would have been bound to find that
that part of the letter not communicated to the underwriters was
material, and that consequently the policy was void. Da Costa v.
iEdmonds, 4 Camp. 143, was an action upon a policy of insurance
on forty carboys of vitriol, and the plaintiff had a verdict upon
proof of usage to carry vitriol on the deck, of which usage the
underwriters were bound to take notice. Lord ELLENBOROUGII
instructed the jury that the underwriters wefe not liable if the
goods were carried on deck without such usage, or if they were not
stowed there in a skilful and proper manner. The only questions
left to the jury were as to the usage, and whether, if the usage
was established, the carboys were properly stowed. The question
of materiality was not submitted. See also, Merchants' Ins. Co.
v. Alger, 82 Penna. St. 380; Marshall on Ins. 848, 349; Millward
v. Hfibbard, 3 A. & E. (N. S. Q. B.) 120; The -Delaware, 14
Wall. 579. The Commission of Appeals in Appleby-v. The Astor
Fire ins. Co., 54 N. Y. 253, reversed a judgment in aa action
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upon a policy of fire insurance, for error of the judge at circuit, in
refusing to direct a verdict for defendant upon the ground that
the risk had been materially varied and increased by the introduction ifito the building of the business of finishing chairs
which had been manufactured in the rough elsewhere. The
court held that it was not a case to be sent to a jury, but
that the defendant was clearly entitled to a verdict and judgment.
Tfpon a reconsideration of the case upon a motion for a re-argument, the court say: 1AAs an ordinary rule it may be safely assumed
that upon an undisputed state of facts, the court in which an action
is pending may render the judgment which the law requires, without
the aid or advice of a jury, and that such action by the court does
not violate any of the maxims of the law." The fact being undisputed that the gold for which this action was brought was not
stowed in the usual place, but in another part of the vessel, where it.
was exposed to a different risk (and to increased hazard, save only
against barratry and theft) from that to which it would have been
exposed had it been stowed where the defendant had a right to
assume it would be stowed, it follows, as a very plain proposition,
that the stowage under the ballast and cargo was a fact material
to the risk, and the judge should have so charged the jury as
requested. The judge should also have charged, as he was'requested
to do, almost in the very language and according to the evidence
of the only underwriter examined as an expert in behalf of the
plaintiff, that the risks to which the gold was exposed in this unusual place, were different'in kind or degree from those to which it
would have been exposed if stowed in the usual place for'the stowage
of specie. If these questions depend upon the testimony of witnesses
the evidence was conclusive, and a .verdict in disregard of it should
have been set aside, and the defendant was therefore entitled to a
direction for a verdict in accordance with it. If the questions were
for the court and jury, irrespective of the testimony of experts, as
to the materiality of the change of place for the stowage, then, as
a matter of law, the defendant was entitled to a verdict upon this
policy upon the evidence and upon the direction of the judge and
the finding of the jury, that the stowage of specie under the ballast
and cargo was stowage in an: unusual manner and place, and that
the fact of such stowage was concealed from the defendant. There
was no room or place for holding, either by the court or jury, that
such unusual stowage was a fact not material to the risk. Its.ma-
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teriality is too obvious to be submitted to a jury, and it was error
to permit a verdict to pass for the plaintiff upon the ground of the
immateriality of this fact under the circumstances of this case.
The risk was not the risk assumed by the defendant, and the
-policy never attached. It is sufficient that the risk resulting in
loss was not the same as that assumed by the defendant. The underwriter had the right to elect whether he would assume the
actual risk and to fix the premium, but it was also an increased
risk. If the facts can be varied upon a retrial, the plaintiff may,
upon some ground other than that already considered, recover;
but, upon the exceptions taken at the trial, defendant, upon this
branich of the case, is entitled to a reversal of the judgment.
These views render it unnecessary to consider many of the exceptions taken by the defendants upon the trial, some of which present questions of interest, but as they mostly relate to the shipment
of gold, they become unimportant if the gold was not covered by
the policy. Among the questions thus eliminated from the case as
presented, is the alleged illicit character of the voyage, and its
effect upon the contract. Many of the questions of evidence are
also unimportant by reason of the effect given by us to the undisputed evidence and the clear change in the risk by the irregular
stowage of the gold. Whether the policies were procured by false
representations in respect to the character, credit, position and history of the plaintiff, was properly submitted to the jury. The evidence that the policies were issued in reliance upon such representations, was not so clear and conclusive as to authorize a withdrawal
of the question from the jury. The testimony of the vice-president of the defendant is explicit that he should have declined the
risk upon the gold had he supposed that it was to be stowed under
the ballast or the cargo, but when he comes to speak upon the
effect and influence of the representations in respect to the plaintiff, he is not as explicit, but says he should have depended a good
deal upon the standing of the house offering the risks, and leaves
ic somewhat in doubt as to the extent his action was influenced, in
taking the risks, by the statements made to him in respect to the
personal character and standing of the plaintiff. Again, there
was evidence touching the actuul character, history and standing
of the plaintiff, and the truth of the statements made to the defendant, which made it eminently proper that the whole question upon
this branch of the dcfence should be submitted to the jury.
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Several exceptions were taken to the exclusion and admission
of evidence upon minor points, which, as they may not be repeated
upon another trial, we do not deem it important to consider. Exceptions were also taken to several of the refusals of request by
the defendant to charge the jury, nore of which we deem it important to refer to.
For the errors suggested, and without considering the other
questions which will not necessarily arise upon another trial, the
judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted, costs to
abide the event.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Rampshire.
CHANDLER v. COE.
In accordance.with the provisions of the Reviscd Statutes of the United States,
enacted June 22d 1874, and the subsequent Act of Congress of March 3d 1875, a
cause will not be removed from a state court to the Circuit Court of the United
States, unless the petition for such removal be filed in the state court before or at
the term at which said cause could first be tried, and before the first trial thereof.

Such petition will not, therefore, be entertained, when filed in the state court
after a verdict in the cause has been rendered, notwithstanding the verdict may
have been set aside for error and a new trial ordered.

THE plaintiff was a citizen of New Hampshire. The defendants
were citizens of EMaine. The defendant, S. R. Bearce, is now dead,
and his death has been suggested on the record. The cause was
tried by jury at the November Term 1873 of the Supreme Judicial
Court, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff. That verdict was set
aside by the whole court at the June Term 1874, and a new trial
granted. At the November Term of the Circuit Court 1874, upon
petition of the defendant, an order was entered on the docket for
the removal of the cause to the federal court, an affidavit and
bond being filed in accordance with the Act of Congress of 1867.
At the present term the cause stood upon the printed docket, and,
although copies in due form had been made out by the clerk at the
request of the defendants, to be entered in the United States Circuit Court, the cause had not been actually entered there, the
copies had notbeen taken from the manual custody of the clerk,
and no term of said United States Circuit Court had intervened.
The plaintiff moved that the order of removal, made at the last
November Term, be rescinded. This motion was granted by the
court, and the defendants excepted. All questions of law and ilis-

CHANI)LER r'. COE.

eretion arising upon the foregoing statement were transferred by
LADD, J.

Bay &. Drew and Geo. A. Binglham, for the plaintiff.
FletcherJ. Heywood and Burns J. Heywood, for the defendants.
FoSTER, C. J., C. C. '-The defendant filed his petition for the
*removal of this cause into the United States court at the November Term of our Circuit Court 1874. his rights in respect of the
removal of the cause, therefore, depend upon the provisions of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, enacted June 22d 1874,
and the subsequent Act of Congress of March 3d 1875, and not
upon the provisions of the Acts of 1866 or 1867, which were repealed
by the enactment of the Revised Statutes. The propriety of the
rescission by the judge presiding at the April Term 1875, depends
upon the settlement of the question whether the defendant was
entitled, under the federal statutes, to have the cause removed,
after one trial upon its merits, before a second trial, which had
been ordered by the full bench for error in the previous trial.
By the terms of the United States Revised Statutes, ch. 7, see.
639, par. III., the petition for removal must be filed "before the
trial or final hearing of the suit."
In Whittier v. The Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 55 N. H. 141, at
the last March session of this court, my brother SMITH, the other
judges concurring, expressed his interpretation of the language
used in the statute as meaning, not before the final trial or final
hearing, but before any trial or any final hearing of the suit.
In Insurance Co. v..Dunn, 19 Wall. 214, in construing the Act
of Congress of 1866, in which the words used were the same as
those adopted in the revision of 1874-" at any time before the
trial or final hearing"-SwAYNE, J., said,-" The language above
quoted-' at any time before the final hearing or trial of the suit'of the Act of March 2d 1867, is not of the same import as the
language of the Act of July 27th 1866, on the same general subject-' at any time before the trial or final hearing;' " and his
deduction is, that under the Act of 1867 a removal might properly
be made, after a trial on the merits and a judgment on the verdict,
in a state where by local statute the party could still demand, as
of right, a second trial, but that doubts, at least, might be enterLADD, J., having presided at the trial, did not

sit.
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tained as to whether such would be the proper construction of the
Act of 1866 ; and if, as he suggests, the change was deliberately
made in 1867 to obviate those doubts and to make the latter act
more comprehensive, so it is equally fair to presume that the
change in 1874 to the language used in the Act of 1866 was
deliberately made, .not to revive "1doubts that might possibly have
arisen" under the Act of 1866, but to make the latter act (of
1874) more restrictive.
Happily, no doubts can remain concerning the present intention
of Congress to limit the removal of causes from the state to the
federal courts to a period antecedent to the first trial of the suit;
for the Act of- March 3d 1875, sect. 3, provides that the petition
for removal shall be filed in the state court "before or at the
term at which said cause could be first tried, and before the trial
thereof."
This act was passed some weeks before the judge made the order
of rescission in the present case, and this declaration of the law
and policy of the federal Congress manifests the prudence of the
judge's order, sbof'ai as the matter rested in his discretion.
In Whittier v. Insurance (o., the petition for removal was made
after a trial and judgment, unreversed by the proceedings in review:
but the distinction between that case and the present is one without
substantial difference, as it seems to me, for in this case, as in that,
the defendant, the verdict against him having been set aside, was
as much entitled to demand a new trial' as in the former case the
party was entitled to demand it under the statute granting a right
,of review. In both cases there was one trial of the cause upon its
merits before application for removal, and in neither case was that
one trial a final trial. In Whittier v. Insurance Co., the petition
for removal was denied.
In Galvin v. Critchlow, 13 Am. Law Reg. (N. S. )137, it was
decided that an action cannot be removed from a state court into
the Circuit Court of the United States under the Act of Congress
of 1867, after a'trial on the merits, although such trial has resulted
in a disagreement of the jury.
A fortiori, if the reasoning of Judge SWAYNE and my brother
SMITH is correct, such cause could not, in the same circumstances,
be removed under the Act of 1866.
It will be borne in mind that the terms used in the Act of 1866
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are "before the trial or final hearing;" those employed in the
Act of 1867 are "before the final hearing or trial."
In Galpin v. Critcdow, Mr. Chief Justice GRAY does not contend that these terms are not equivalent. They are, in fact,
whatever may have been the intention of the legislators, mere
transpositions in the two several acts. And, regarding the words
under consideration as practically synonymous, the learned chief
justice infers that the Act of 1866 (and 1867 likewise) "has
regard to suits in equity as well as at law ;" because it enlarges
the right of removal under the Act of 1789 (which was "at any
time before trial"), by conferring the right in suits brought "for
the purpose of restraining or enjoining" the defendant. In the
Act of 1866, ch. 288, we find for the first time, if I am not
mistaken, the words "or final hearing of the cause" added to the
words "at any time before the trial."
"Trial," says Mr. Chief Justice GRAY, "appropriately designates a trial by the jury of an issue which will determine the facts
in an action at law ; and ' final hearing,' in contradistinction to
hearings upon interlocutory matters, and hearing of the cause upon
its merits by.a judge sitting in equity. The whole effect of the
change in the statute in this respect seems to us to have been to
allow the defendant the same time to elect whether he will remove
the case into the federal court, as he has to prepare for a trial
at law, or hearing upon the merits in equity in the state
court; * * * but not to allow him, after the experiment of entering upon oe such trial or hearing in the court in which the suit
is commenced, to transfer the case to another jurisdiction."
The learned chief justice "cannot believe that Oongress, by
transposing" the words, "intended that a right of removal depending upon a mere affidavit of the party to a condition of things
which litigants are too often prone to suspect, and conferred by
this statute upon a plaintiff who has voluntarily resorted to the
state court, as well as a defendant who has been compelled to appear therein to protect his rights, should be exercised after once
submitting the case to be decided in the state court upon its merits,
and at a later stage than any other suit is authorized to be removed from the state to the federal courts, except by writ of error
after judgment."
Judge REDFIELD, in a note appended to this case, as reported
in the Law Register, commends the.opinion not only for the" inge-
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nious and happy argument" presented therein, but for its "fairness
and dignity," calculated, as the conclusion of the court is, "to maintain proper respect for the spirit of the national legislation in general, especially towards the state courts."
In holding that the ruling of the judge at ni8i'PriuS,rescinding
the order for a removal of .this cause before the intervention of a
term of the federal court at which it would have been entered, was
right in point of law and sound discretion, we do no more than
declare, without arrogance or assumption, that, except by writ of
error from the Supreme Court of the United States, whose judgment
is conclusive upon all the judicial tribunals of the land, the jurisdiction of our own state courts is not to be reduced to "very
inferior and insignificant proportions."
If the views which I have expressed are sustained by my brethren,
the defendant's exceptions must be overruled.
CUSHING, C. J.,

and

SMITH, J.,

concurred.

iSupreme Court of Ohio.
JONES, STRANATHAN & CO. v. WILLIAM GREAVES.
On the trial of a civil action, wherein the claim or defence is based on an alleged
fraud, the issue may be determined in accordance with the preponderance or weight
of evidence, whether the facts constituting the alleged fraud do, or do not, amount
to an indictable offence.
MOTION for leave to file a petition in error to the District Court
of Muskingum county.
The original action was brought by William Greaves against
Jones, Stranthan & Co., to recover a balance alleged to be due
to the plaintiff for labor and materials in tin-roofing a storehouse
of defendants under a special contract. The contract, as the
plaintiff claimed, designated the material to be used as "the best
quality of roofing-tin ;" but the defendants claimed that the contract required "ix charcoal tin" to be used. The latter is the
better quality of tin, and worth four dollars per box more than the
former. The contract was entered into in this way: The defendants proposed'for bids in writing, specifying the quality of the
material to be furnished for the roof by the bidder ; the plaintiff's
bid was $1100, which bid the defendants accepted and promised
to pay. Afterward, the plaintiff purchased tin of the quality
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known as "the best quality of roofing-tin ;" whereupon the do:.
femdants objected to the use of this quality of tin, unless the
plaintiff would agree to abate from the contract price four dollars
per box of tin. The plaintiff agreed to the reduction and used the
material so purchased in making the roof. Afterward the plaintiff refused to accept in payment less than the original contract
price, on the ground that his agreement to abate the four dollars
per box was obtained by the fraudulent acts and representations
of the defendants. The fraud practised by the defendants, as
claimed by the plaintiff, was thus: That after the making of the
original contract, the defendants fraudulently altered the written
proposal for bid.s, by inserting therein the words " ix charcoal tin,"
and afterwards induced the plaintiff to believe that the specification
of materials, at the time plaintiff's bid was made, required the furnishing of the better and higher-priced quality of tin.
This question of fraud was put in issue by the pleadings, and
testimony was offered, on the trial, tending to prove the issue on
both sides.
The Court of Common Pleas was requested by the defendants
to charge the jury that before they could find the defendants guilty
of the fraud alleged, they must be satisfied from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the fraud had been committed.
This request the court refused to give, but did charge that a preponderance of evidence would be sufficient to prove the same.
Exceptions were taken. Verdict and judgment were rendered for
the plaintiff. On error, the District Court affirmed the judgment
below ; and the only matters assigned for error here relate to the
refusal of the Common Pleas to charge as requested and to the
charge as given.
Evans J- Beard, for the motion.
31. H1. Granger(with whom was D. B. Gary), contrA.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MCILVAINE, C. J.-There is no doctrine of the law settled more
firmly than the rule which authorizes issues of fact +incivil cases to
be determined in accordance with the preponderance or weight of
the evidence. The reason of the rule no doubt is, that as between
man and man, where a loss must fall upon one or the other, it is
right that the law should cast it upon him who is shown to have
VOL. XXIV.-
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been the cause of the loss, by proof establishing the reasonable
probability of the fact.
But in criminal cases, where compensation for the injury done
is not an element, the rule may well be, and is, different. In these
cases, where the sole object of the prosecution is punishment, a
humane principle is introduced, which requires that the guilt of
the accused should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This
principle is often expressed in the maxim, "It is better that ninety
and nine guilty persons should go acquit, than that one innocent
person should be punished."
It is claimed, however, by the plaintiffs in error (defendants
below), that civil actions, wherein fraud amounting to a criminal
-offence is directly in issue, are excepted from the rule above stated;
.and that in such cases the rule of the criminal law applies. And
they further claim, that the facts in issue in the case below, constituting the'fraud alleged against them, amounted to the crime of
forgery. Whether forgery could have been committed by altering
the paper referred to in the pleadings, or whether the alteration
alleged to have been made by the defendants below amounted to
t1he crime of forgery, are questions we need not stop to answer, as
we are satisfied, in any event, that the issue of fraud, as made in
this case, did not take it out of the operation of the general rule
applicable to the trial of civil issues. If there be any exception
to the rule, of the kind claimed, it is limited to cases where it is
-necessary, in order to maintain the issue made, to prove that a
,crime was in fact committed; as, for instance, in justification of a
.slander imputing a crime.
. We have no occasion now to question the existence of such limited exception, but I may be permitted to say that all argument
and all authority are not in its favor. It was denied, with great
reason, in Munson v. Atwood, 80 Conn. 102, an action under a
statute, to recover treble damages for property feloniously taken
and carried away.
We are aware that an exception to the rule, broader than we
have stated it above, has been recognised in a few insurancecases:
16.Ohio 324; 2 Greenl. Ev., sect. 408. It has been held, however, to the contrary, in other well-considered cases: 1 Gray 529;
1 La. Ann. 216.
What the rule may be in insurance cases we need not now determine, further than to say that if there. be no ground of distinc-
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tion between them and other civil cases, it is extremely doubtful
whether, as to them, there is any exception to the general rule ;
as i , is quite certain that an insurer may successfully defend, in
an action on his policy, on the ground of gross or wilful misconduct on the part of the insured, which does not amount to criminal
conduct.
We think it is going to the verge of the law, to hold that an
issue of fact, in a civil case, must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, even where a charge of crime is directly made, and where,
also, it is necessary that it be made in order to sustain the claim
or the defence ; as it is difficult to see how a person, who wrongs
another without criminal intent, and is liable in damages on a
mere preponderance of the evidence, can shelter himself from liability behind a reasonable doubt, by merely adding to the wrongful act a criminal purpose. Of course, we are not now speaking
of those enormous crimes where all personal injury is merged in
the public wrong; nor do we intimate that in all civil actions
the issues should be determined by a mere preponderance of the
testimony offered on the trial, however slight. Where the facts
charged involve moral turpitude, there is a presumption of innocence which stands as evidence in favor of the party charged; and
the more heinous the offence, the stronger the presumption. It is
only where the testimony, when considered in connection with the
presumptions of law arising in the case, preponderates in favor of
the charge that its truth should be found; but when so considered,
by discreet and reasonable triers, the issue should be determined in
accordance with the preponderance, although it may not be said
that the proof has removed all reasonable doubts.
The conclusion, therefore, to which we have come, is this: that
whatever may be the rule in civil cases, where the claim or defence
can be established only by averment and proof that a crime has
in fact been committed, in all other civil cases the issue should be
determined by the weight or preponderance of the evidence,
whether it be or be not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubts.
How, then, stands this case ? It was not necessary, in order to
maintain the issue on his part, that the plaintiff below should have
proved, nor was it necessary for him to aver in his pleadings, that
the alteration in the written proposal for bids was a forgery within
the meaning of the Crimes Act. Indeed the consequences of the
alteration were the same to him and to his case, whether there was

